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What is the Underground Economy?
The underground economy is a pervasive entity. It will always be 
with us. The formal or recorded economy is the new kid on the block. 
The formal economy only came into existence as we began to try to 
measure, broadly tax, and regulate economic activity. It is a creature by 
and large of the post-World War II period. We began to have broad- 
based taxes and benefits systems (during the 1930s and World War II), 
extensive regulations (mainly a post-World War II phenomenon) and 
national statistical systems (beginning in the late 1920s and picking up 
speed after World War II) mainly during the 1930s and 1940s.
It is the formal economy, the recorded, taxed, and regulated econ 
omy, that is the recent arrival—not the unrecorded or underground 
economy. This said, why are we concerned about this economy?
When and Why Did We Become Concerned 
with the Underground Economy?
There have been two periods of concern about the underground 
economy. The first period of concern occurred during and shortly after 
World War II and was largely confined to the United States and Can 
ada. The large increases in taxes and regulations needed for the war 
effort drove much activity underground.
The second period of concern began in the late 1970s and spread 
from the United States to most of the developed world. By and large 
the underground economy has been of little concern in Third World 
countries (other than to the taxing authorities). Many developing coun 
tries (e.g., Brazil) even make government loans to enterprises that 
operate largely underground. As a source of employment and entrepre-
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neurial activity, the underground economy is more often cultivated 
than criticized in Third World countries.
The most recent period of concern about the underground economy 
in the developed world began with a series of articles in the popular 
press during the late 1970s claiming that there was a large and rapidly 
growing underground economy. Politicians quickly picked up on this 
because it appeared to provide a "painless" method of dealing with the 
deficit (annual deficits in the United States averaging over $50 billion a 
year began in 1975 and deficits of over $100 billion began in 1982). 
The existence and claimed rapid growth of the underground economy 
provided support for deregulation and lowering of marginal tax rates— 
politically popular policies during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
My own saga with the underground economy illustrates the source 
and nature of concern. In 1978,1 was sitting quietly in my office at the 
University of North Carolina when I received a call from the Chief 
Economist of the Joint Economic Committee. He requested that I write 
a monograph on the "underground economy" for the Committee's Spe 
cial Study on Economic Change. I replied that I would have to know 
what this economy was before I could respond. His description sug 
gested a diverse and complicated set of activities that appeared to have 
little in common other than that they were somehow hidden from gov 
ernmental agencies. The task seemed overwhelming and he wanted a 
first draft in six months. It was a hot topic and the monograph needed 
to be completed yesterday if not sooner. I asked for time to consider his 
request. I was strongly inclined to say no, since it sounded like a topic 
that would require a couple of years to deal with adequately.
As it happened, I was meeting with a mathematical economist, Carl 
Simon (Department of Economics, University of Michigan), for lunch 
to discuss a saddle point problem. Since I was late, I provided a 
detailed description of the phone call by way of apology. To my amaze 
ment, Carl indicated that he would love to undertake such a project 
with me. He solved my saddle point problem and I agreed to do the 
monograph jointly with him.
Substantial Interest by Other Agencies
At the same time that the Joint Economic Committee was commis 
sioning our study, other congressional committees (e.g., the House
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Committee on Ways and Means) asked for a study of nonfiling by the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) and pressured the Internal Revenue 
Service (BRS) into providing an estimate of unreported taxable income. 
The IRS did not wish to undertake estimates but was required to do so 
by Congress. These reports resulted in numerous congressional hear 
ings during the early 1980s which provided valuable support for the 
deregulation and detaxation movements that accompanied the Reagan 
presidency.
A Dispassionate Look at the Underground Economy Today
It has now been over fifteen years since the rediscovery of the under 
ground economy. There has been much research on the topic. The 
political passions that originally inspired renewed interest in the under 
ground economy have cooled, at least somewhat. We are now at a point 
to step back and consider the nature and importance of this economy. 
In 1982, Carl Simon and I published a book, an expanded and updated 
version of our study for the Joint Economic Committee, on the under 
ground economy (Simon and Witte 1982). The editor gave the book the 
title Beating the System. With the advantage of hind sight and an addi 
tional fifteen years of research, I would like to consider whether those 
in the underground economy are beating the system. I will discuss the 
impact of the underground economy on those who participate little, if 
at all, in its activities, as well as on those who are members of this 
underground.
What Kind of Activity Occurs in the Underground Economy?
Activities in the underground economy can usefully be divided into 
three categories: (1) "pure" tax evasion, (2) the irregular economy, and 
(3) illegal activities. The nature of these activities and the reasons for 
our concern are quite different for the three types of activity, and so I 
will discuss each type of activity separately before trying to reach gen 
eral conclusions concerning the underground economy.
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Pure Tax Evasion
Pure tax evasion, which is far from pure, occurs when individuals 
and businesses fail to fully report earnings from perfectly legal activi 
ties carried out in businesses that are properly registered and recorded 
in our national statistics. It also occurs when individuals and busi 
nesses overstate the deductions to which they are entitled.
Perhaps half of all Americans engage in "pure" tax evasion. How 
ever, most evasion is rather small scale. We are a nation of tax-evasion 
nibblers, although some individuals do take large gulps.
The level of evasion is very unequally spread throughout the popula 
tion. The amount varies with type of income, amount of income, and 
with attitudes toward laws and government.
Type of income
Wage and salary income is reported most accurately. We don't know 
whether this stems from the law-abidingness of the middle class or 
from the extensive system of withholding and information reporting. 
"Paper trailed" income and income from which taxes are withheld are 
far more fully reported than income that generates no information for 
the IRS. Small businesses report a smaller proportion of their income 
than do large corporations. Rent and royalty income is less fully 
reported than dividend and interest income. (See U.S. Department of 
the Treasury 1990 or U.S. General Accounting Office 1990 for details.)
Amount of income
The relationship between the proportion of true tax liability reported 
and income is U-shaped. Tax compliance is highest for the middle 
class and lower for both poorer and richer individuals. We do not know 
the reason for the U-shaped relationship. People with high and low 
incomes have more opportunities to underreport income than do the 
vast middle class of wage and salary workers. For example, the poor 
are often involved in the irregular economy which keeps few written 
records. The better-off often have complex transactions which make 
overstating deductions and understating income more difficult to 
detect. The poor and the rich are often less accepting of mainstream 
morals and ethics. This may make tax evasion more acceptable, at least 
for some members of these groups.
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Attitudes toward laws and the government
There are large geographic differences in tax compliance, with the 
Southwest and Southeast being least compliant and the Midwest and 
Northeast most compliant. It is not clear why these geographic differ 
ences exist. However, audit rates have traditionally been lower in the 
Southwest, particularly southern California, so the tax gamble has a 
larger expected return in this area. Research indicates that areas of 
rapid growth are more noncompliant than stable areas. For example, 
see Beron, Tauchen, and Witte (1992).
A consistent finding in the tax compliance literature is that women 
are more compliant than men. We do not know whether this stems from 
greater socialization of women, their greater aversion to risk, or the 
nature of their incomes.
Why are we concerned with pure tax evasion?
The most obvious answer is that we want everyone to "pay their fair 
share." When some members of society pay less than their full tax lia 
bility, the rest of us suffer. Government can respond to decreased tax 
revenue in one of three ways. First, it can increase taxes so the rest of 
us pay more. Second, it can cut expenditures so that everyone has 
fewer publicly provided goods and services. Finally, it can finance gov 
ernment expenditures by running large deficits. All of these potential 
responses to tax evasion hurt those of us who are struggling to survive 
in the formal economy.
The Irregular Economy
The irregular economy generally encompasses the production of 
legal goods and services in unregistered and, hence, largely untaxed 
and unrecorded, small businesses. Activities in the irregular economy 
are an important form of underground activity.
What goods and services are produced in the irregular economy?
Production in the irregular economy consists mostly of personal and 
household services. Typical personal services produced in the irregular 
economy are child care, nursing services, legal, and accounting ser 
vices. Household services such as gardening, remodeling, and auto
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repair also are frequently provided in the irregular economy rather than 
by registered and licensed individuals.
Some goods and services are also produced in the irregular econ 
omy. Examples include food, clothing, jewelry, recreation, and tour 
ism. Evasion of taxes on petroleum products is quite large. Organized 
crime, particularly the "Russian mafia," is heavily involved in tax eva 
sion on gasoline and other fuels.
Firms producing in the irregular economy tend to be small. Hence, 
production tends to occur in areas where economies of scale are lim 
ited. The irregular economy also provides a gateway for some new 
immigrants, legal and illegal, and for some new entrepreneurs.
While tales of sweatshops employing hundreds of illegal aliens 
appear in the press, the more typical employment setting is an individ 
ual moonlighting in the irregular economy. 1 The labor force for the 
irregular economy comes largely from people who work full time in 
the formal economy.
Costs and benefits of the irregular economy
To those in the formal economy. The confirmation hearings of early 
Clinton nominees point up the prevalence of purchases from the irregu 
lar economy by all strata of U.S. society. We would be hard-pressed to 
run our households and provide for our personal needs without the. 
irregular economy. This economy provides us with more convenient 
and often less expensive (both in terms of time and money) goods than 
the formal economy. The quality of goods and services provided by the 
irregular economy tends to be highly variable, since the only quality 
controls are word-of-mouth reports. Regulation and government infor 
mation provide important quality control that is missing from the irreg 
ular economy.
Irregular economic activity pays little if any tax. This means that 
governments must tax the rest of us more, provide fewer services or 
run large deficits—a privilege only allowed the federal government and 
selected state and local governments.
To those working in the irregular economy. Jobs in the irregular 
economy have advantages and disadvantages. For those moonlighting 
in the irregular economy (the majority of this economy's labor force), 
the economy has primarily benefits. Income is free of taxation, and
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work methods are left to the individual's discretion. Work may be more 
informal and better integrated with the family and communal elements 
of the individual's life than is possible with much formal employment.
Individuals working exclusively in the irregular economy are of two 
basic types—those there by choice (e.g., retirees, welfare recipients, 
mothers with small children, "free spirits") and those there for lack of 
alternatives (e.g., illegal aliens, the unemployed without unemploy 
ment benefits, new entrants to the labor force).
For individuals working exclusively in the irregular economy by 
choice, the irregular economy provides an entrepot or a more agreeable 
combination of work conditions and wages. Take for example the indi 
vidual with small children. She may choose to work at home because 
of an ability to combine child care with her work activities. Similarly, 
the handicapped individual may find the home environment with its 
familiarity or convenience more congenial than the more rigid and 
structured work environments typical of the formal economy.
For those working in the irregular economy for lack of known alter 
native, the irregular economy provides sustenance, but at a cost. The 
cost is the foregone benefits available in the formal economy such as 
health benefits. Work conditions can be harsh and benefits nonexistent.
Illegal Activities
To this point, we have considered mainly activities that run afoul of 
our regulatory and tax laws, but not our criminal law. To close on what 
might be considered a low note, I will now turn to activities that violate 
our criminal laws. In spite of declining crime rates, crime is still one of 
the topic of most serious current concern to the U.S. public. It also pro 
vides the titillation of the forbidden.
In terms of economic activity, crime comes in two forms—illegal 
transfers of goods and income, and production of illegal goods and ser 
vices.
Illegal transfers of goods and services
The illegal sector has developed complex ways of transferring 
income and goods among individuals just as our legal economy has. 
Lacking the power to tax, the illegal economy transfers by means of
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force (e.g., "your money or your life"), or subterfuge (e.g., fraud, coun 
terfeiting).
Like the irregular economy, the illegal transfer economy seems to 
provide mainly part-time employment. Further, illegal transfers of the 
"blue-collar" variety provide surprisingly low returns (see Reuter, 
MacCoun, and Murphy 1990). Illegal transfers by subterfuge, such as 
the notorious financial dealings of the 1980s, provide far larger returns 
but to very few individuals. Economists are split on whether or not 
activities such as "insider trading" increase or decrease market effi 
ciency.
Production and distribution of illegal goods and services
The major goods produced and distributed illegally in our country 
are illegal drugs. Illegal drugs run the gamut from substances believed 
to have large-scale debilitating effects (e.g., heroin, crack) to those 
considered by many to have relatively minor effects (e.g., marijuana). 
As Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy (1990) have recently documented, 
illegal drug sales provide good income for mainly part-time work. 
However, drug dealing is a very risky endeavor with substantial 
chances of arrests (over 1 in 5 per year) and death or injury (1 in 10 per 
year).
As Reuter and his colleagues have described it, selling illegal drugs 
is the preferred illegal form of "moonlighting" for many urban males, 
particularly minority males. Drug dealing provides sporadic (mainly 
nights and weekends), high-paying, part-time employment. Individuals 
selling drugs daily in Washington, D.C. in the late 1980s typically 
earned about $2,000 per month while individuals selling one day a 
week or less had income supplements of $50 or less. The typical dealer 
in Washington, D.C. is a black male between 18 and 29 years of age. 
(See Pozo (1996) for a further discussion of drug markets.)
Our attitude toward drugs tends to be both emotional and schizo 
phrenic. We have a spectrum of rules governing the sale and use of var 
ious drugs. Some drugs (e.g., generic drugs) are sold in mainly 
unregulated spot markets (i.e., you can buy them freely at your local 
supermarket or drugstore). Others, such as tobacco and alcohol, are 
singled out for special taxation (i.e., excise taxation) and purchase is 
restricted to individuals who have reached a specified age. Prescription 
drugs require that a medical doctor authorize use. Finally, there are a
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whole series of drugs (e.g., marijuana, cocaine, heroin) that we gener 
ally make illegal either to sell or use.
Consider the two spectrums—one spectrum of regulation possibili 
ties and one spectrum of taxation possibilities. Generic drugs would 
fall at one end of the regulation spectrum and illegal drugs at the other. 
Oddly, generic and illegal drugs both fall on the untaxed end of the tax 
spectrum and alcohol and tobacco at the high end of this spectrum. If 
one considers the placement of various drugs on these two spectrums, 
it is very difficult to see a consistent set of priorities.
The debate about illegal drugs has mainly centered on the two 
extremes of the regulation spectrum—legalization versus criminaliza- 
tion. This seems to narrow our options unnecessarily. For various drugs 
that we currently make illegal, we may want to consider a number of 
different positionings on the regulatory and tax spectrums. For exam 
ple, one could imagine making marijuana a prescription drug and plac 
ing an excise tax on use. For a compilation of recent papers on drug 
laws, see Krauss and Lazear (1991).
Perhaps we need to think more carefully about the use of drugs and 
the benefits that they provide users. Some drugs are designed purely to 
treat disease. It is hard to imagine someone taking an antibiotic for the 
fun of it. Others serve both treatment and sensory needs (e.g., pain 
relief, relaxation). Valium is used by some as a tranquilizer, by some as 
a muscle relaxant, and by some to produce a euphoric state. Still other 
drugs seem to have mainly recreational or psychological benefits (e.g., 
alcohol, tobacco).
We also need to consider the external effect that drug use entails. 
Consumption of some drugs imposes costs on society as a whole in the 
form of higher medical expenditures, increased crime, or decreased 
productivity. Consumption of others provides external benefits by low 
ering medical costs, making people more psychologically healthy (e.g., 
less depressed, less aggressive), and more productive. Economists 
would suggest that you encourage use of the drugs with positive exter 
nal effects and discourage use of those with negative external effects. 
Encouragement can come in the form of subsidies (e.g., government- 
financed medical research or subsidized prescriptions such as under 
Medicaid or Medicare). Discouragement can come in the form of taxa 
tion, information campaigns (very effective for tobacco), restrictive
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access (e.g., age restrictions on purchase, requiring prescriptions), or 
making the substance illegal either under the civil or criminal code.
If we placed all drugs on the regulatory and tax spectrums described 
above and considered how the net benefits of each drug relates to its 
position on the spectrums, we might find some surprising locations. 
Such an exercise might also suggest innovative policies in an area 
where thinking has been impacted for some time.
The major services produced in the illegal economy are gambling 
(increasingly preempted by legal forms), prostitution, and loan shark 
ing. While these industries are still quite large, all are believed to have 
declined in recent years. Prostitution has been hard hit by AIDS and 
more liberal social mores regarding premarital sex. The estimated 
number of individuals working as prostitutes is believed to have 
declined since 1980. Legalization of gambling and low interest rates 
have taken a similar toll on the gambling and loan sharking industries. 
(See Carlson 1990 for details.)
Costs and Benefits of the Illegal Economy
It is not hard to make the argument that the illegal economy as a 
whole has costs that substantially outweigh the benefits that flow from 
this economy. There is even a debate in economics regarding whether 
or not we should count any benefits that result from infringement of 
our criminal law. The issue is whether, when breaking the social con 
tract, the individual has lost his or her right to be counted in the "social 
welfare function." For a discussion of whose benefits should be 
included in the social welfare function, see Trumbull (1990).
Even if we assume that the gains of individuals who break the social 
contract are to be counted, it is hard to justify the illegal economy on 
economic grounds. The transfer payments of the illegal economy are 
quixotic at best and worsen the income distribution in many cases. Fur 
ther, these transfers, on balance, lower productivity in the formal econ 
omy.
The costs and benefits of the production of illegal goods and ser 
vices are more difficult to assess. If we accept the proposition that our 
criminal laws reflect strongly held moral beliefs, then the costs to soci 
ety of illegal markets are substantial. However, it may be that at least 
some current laws reflect the moral beliefs of previous generations. If
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so, these laws may no longer be justified on efficiency grounds. For 
example, it may be that many citizens no longer support the sodomy 
laws or adultery laws that remain on the books in many states.
From an economist's perspective, the relevant question might be: Do 
the total costs of the activity outweigh the total benefits? This is, of 
course, the traditional criterion of benefit-cost analysis. In some cases 
the benefit/cost ratio seems clear. Most citizens would agree that child 
prostitution imposes more costs than benefits on society and that it has 
a high moral cost as well. Transactions between consenting adults are 
more difficult to evaluate. When an adult prostitute makes a deal with 
an adult client, the deal is clearly utility-enhancing for the parties to the 
transaction. Most negative externalities from this transaction flow from 
the fact that prostitution is illegal, not from the transaction per se.
There are clearly transactions between adults that yield sufficient 
negative externalities that we wish to outlaw them. For example, it is 
hard to justify legalizing without severely taxing or requiring prescrip 
tions for such drugs as heroin. However, it seems wise to carefully con 
sider the full spectrum of options (i.e., regulations and taxation) before 
deciding that making something illegal is a reasonable thing to do. It is 
also wise to consider the degree to which criminal prohibitions can be 
enforced. Activities between consenting adults are notoriously difficult 
to enforce. Making laws that are unenforceable may make us feel bet 
ter. However, they have substantial hidden costs. They tend to decrease 
respect for law and, hence, make other laws more difficult to enforce.
Beating the System?
Returning to the question with which we began the paper: Is the 
underground economy beating the system?
Benefits and Costs to the Nibblers and Nonparticipants
Those of us who are only peripherally touched by the underground 
economy are, I would contend, harmed more than we are benefited by 
it.
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Pure Tax Evasion
We all bitch and moan about taxes, but pay a substantial amount of 
what we owe. Some tax revenue is wasted or spent on things we would 
rather not have, but much tax revenue is spent for things we value very 
highly—e.g., law enforcement, water and sewers, education. Tax evad 
ers lower the amount of tax revenue that our tax system would other 
wise be able to produce. The public sector can respond in one of three 
ways: (1) lower the level of goods and services provided, (2) raise 
taxes on the rest of us, (3) in the case of the federal government, 
increase the deficit.
Tax increases enacted to raise revenue lost to evasion tend to fall dis 
proportionately on the wage and salary earnings of the middle class. 
Tax evasion tends to redistribute income to low-income and high- 
income groups willing to falsify tax returns. This is an odd and rather 
unpalatable form of redistribution. Tax evasion imposes an implicit tax 
on honesty, a characteristic we would be better off subsidizing than 
taxing.
Many tax evaders do truly beat the system, but their gain is at our 
cost. While audit rates have fallen dramatically during the last two 
decades from 10 percent in the late 1960s to under 1 percent today, the 
amount of information-matching has gone up considerably and will 
increase further with the IRS systems-modernization effort. The level 
of penalties for evasion and the frequency of their imposition has gone 
up dramatically as well.
Decreasing the current level of tax evasion appears to be a socially 
desirable goal. How can we most cost-effectively achieve this goal? 
Tax simplification and increased information-reporting coupled with 
systems modernization seem most promising at this point. The Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) simplified our tax laws at least in some 
ways. Tax laws passed since 1986 have, on balance, made our tax code 
more complicated. They have also raised nominal tax rates on better- 
off individuals. The last time this happened, both evasion and avoid 
ance increased. Nominal tax rates were progressive, but the tax burden 
did not fall disproportionately on the rich.
We need to have realistic expectations regarding the amount of tax 
evasion that can be cost-beneficially combated, given our present tax 
code. The amount is probably less than 20 percent. It would never be
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cost beneficial to uncover and punish most tax evasion. As with taxes 
and death, we need to learn to live with a certain level of tax evasion.
The Irregular Economy
The irregular economy appears to be the least virulent or relevantly 
most beneficial sector of the underground economy. This economy 
provides goods and services as well as jobs that might not otherwise be 
available. However, both the goods and services and the jobs tend to be 
of highly variable quality.
This economy may be most successfully attacked by providing 
alternative entrepot for new immigrants and new labor market entrants. 
It may also be combated by providing lower levels of regulation and 
increased benefits for participating in the formal economy. For exam 
ple, the extensive reference and referral system of Massachusetts, 
which provides customers, training, and services (e.g., accounting ser 
vices) to child care providers, has led most child care providers, includ 
ing providers of child care in their home, to obtain state licenses as 
required by state law. Only approximately 5 percent of family day care 
providers are unlicensed in Massachusetts. Other states that require 
family day care providers to be licensed but don't provide benefits to 
licensees have as much as 50 percent of providers failing to comply 
with the law.
Some workers in the irregular economy beat the system. Others are 
beaten by it. The general public may, on balance, benefit from the 
existence of this economy, but the balance is a delicate one.
The Illegal Economy
This is largely an economy employing young males. It provides an 
exciting alternative to the low-wage jobs currently available to young 
males with high school educations or less. However, these jobs come at 
high cost to the rest of us. The transfers of the illegal economy are very 
costly in terms of lifestyle, antitheft devices, and fear. Goods generally 
lose, not gain, value as a result of illegal transfers. This is reflected in 
the low prices available from fences.
While illegal goods and services often provide net benefits to those 
who purchase, the benefits may be short-lived and may come at sub-
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stantial cost to the general public. Effective policy to combat the illegal 
economy may combine legalization of some goods and services (e.g., 
gambling, prostitution, marijuana) with stricter enforcement of others.
Conclusions
Everyone wants a fast buck. It is the American way. We are a nation 
that began its existence with a revolt against government. We didn't 
like taxation when the British imposed it upon us and we don't like it 
much better now that we impose it upon ourselves.
We are a society of individualists who resent government interfer 
ence in either our work or consumption choices. However, it has been a 
long while since we have been a frontier society. We have come to rely 
on government to provide goods and services, to regulate behavior, and 
to enforce a commonly agreed upon social code. The underground 
economy points up gaps in government enforcement and shows us the 
limits of government.
Through our representatives, we make decisions regarding the 
goods and services we wish our federal, state, and local governments to 
provide. To finance these expenditures, we agree to a set of user 
charges and taxes. Evasion of taxes is often in the individual's narrow 
self-interest. He or she can enjoy publicly provided goods and services 
without paying for them. In the jargon of economics, the individual can 
be a "free rider." The tax evader is beating the system, but at the 
expense of the rest of us.
As citizens, we require licenses to undertake certain types of busi 
nesses (e.g., medicine, plumbing) and we regulate the way in which 
businesses are allowed to operate (e.g., through environmental and 
health and safety regulations). We do this to enforce minimum stan 
dards. Individuals and firms operating in the irregular economy avoid 
both licensing and regulatory requirements. In some cases this evasion 
of regulatory requirements has no external costs. For some goods and 
services, consumers may obtain adequate information regarding the 
quality of products informally. In other cases, irregular activity has 
high external costs and information regarding quality may be both hard 
to obtain and unreliable. Unregulated firms may dispose of hazardous
Beating the System? 143
materials in ways that cause substantial social harm. Sweatshops may 
provide hazardous and unhealthy work environments. Some unregis 
tered child care providers may damage young children in ways that 
have serious social consequences.
Some producers and consumers of the goods and services of the 
irregular economy are beating the system and at little or no cost to the 
rest of us. Others are beating the system, but imposing substantial costs 
on the rest of us. We need to think carefully about what we license and 
what we regulate. We should impose mandatory licensing only in areas 
where informal information regarding quality is either likely to be 
unreliable or costly to obtain. In other areas we may be better served by 
allowing consumers to choose whether they purchase from licensed or 
unlicensed providers. We should only regulate in areas where external 
effects are large or where there are substantial asymmetries in power 
(e.g., the sweatshop situation) or information (e.g., pharmaceuticals).
Our criminal laws reflect our society's generally held beliefs about 
what behaviors are acceptable. We condemn certain types of transfers 
(e.g., theft, fraud) because they offend our sense of fairness and 
because they lower the productivity of our formal economy. We outlaw 
the sale and consumption of certain goods and services because they 
offend our moral sensibilities and/or because they have substantial neg 
ative externalities.
The mores of our society have changed quite rapidly since the 
1960s, with each generation developing its own sense of what is 
socially acceptable. Our criminal laws change much more slowly. It is 
hard to say if the rigidity of what Bagehot called the "cake of custom" 
is, on balance, good or bad. Most violations of most of our criminal 
laws, on balance, hurt us as a society. It is not even clear that many of 
the participants in illegal activities (e.g., the young drug dealer or pros 
titute) are in the long run beating the system.
Are those who participate in the underground economy beating the 
system? From a short-run, narrowly individual perspective, they by and 
large are. However, the system they are beating is a system that we set 
up because we believed that it was by and large beneficial to society. 
The tax laws, regulations, and criminal code evolve slowly and can be 
affected by special interests. The underground economy will grow in 
those areas where existing laws and regulations are inefficient or most 
at odds with current mores. The underground provides an escape valve.
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It can also provide valuable information regarding rules and regula 
tions that need to be reassessed.
Tax evasion peaked in the early 1980s because our tax laws had 
rates and provisions that made evasion both relatively easy and very 
beneficial. Since TRA86, levels of evasion have declined. TRA86 
broadened the base of taxation by limiting loopholes. It also lowered 
tax rates. The growth of the tax evasion component of the underground 
economy during the late 1970s and early 1980s warned us that some 
thing was wrong with our tax laws. Our response was to alter the tax 
code, not to increase enforcement.
As a society, we would be wise to look closely at areas of rapid 
growth in the underground economy. These growth areas may need to 
be attacked by increased enforcement. For example, the growth of 
crack use during the 1980s was effectively dealt with by a combination 
of enforcement and education. However, rapid growth may warn us 
that it is time to revise outdated and inefficient rules. For example, the 
failure of many upper middle income nominees for federal posts to pay 
nanny taxes did not lead to greater enforcement. It led to changes in tax 
laws and regulations.
NOTE
1. A Michigan study found that SO percent of illegal vendors of goods and services had regular 
jobs, and that only 5 percent were working off-the-books full time. It is estimated that over half of 
all illegal aliens had income tax withheld and, hence, were working in the regular as opposed to 
the irregular economy.
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